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Recent quantitative studies have advanced 
emotions research substantially, but they have 
done little to resolve enduring large-scale 
controversies. This article suggests that tacit 
creationism is at the root of the problem. 
Envisioning emotions as aspects of a designed 
machine encourages searching for answers of a 
kind that do not exist. The quest for the Holy Grail 
of agreement on the number, nature, and 
functions of emotions is futile because the 
emotions are aspects of organically complex 
systems whose structures and functions are 
radically different from those of machines. A fully 
evolutionary foundation for emotions research 
discourages hopes for simple elegant models but 
it can nonetheless advance research by dispelling 
misconceptions and suggesting new questions.  
 
 
    
    
    
   
   
    
      
   
     
    
   
    
        
     
  
    
        
  
possibility that some of these questions have no 
answers of the sort we have been seeking.  
This article argues that progress in emotions 
research has been slowed by tacit creationism. 
By tacit creationism I mean viewing 
organisms as if they are products of design, 
without attributing the design to a deity. Few 
scientists attribute the characteristics of 
organisms to a supernatural power, but many 
nonetheless view organisms as if they were 
designed machines. Organisms are, however, 
different from machines in several crucial ways. 
 
    
     
   
    
     
   
   
   
  
  
   
  
   
    
      
  
        
   
 
    
    
    
   
   
  
   
  
 
     
    
   
 
    
   
   
   
     
   
    
      
       
       
      
       
      
         
     
       
       
    
        
        
      
       
       
        
     
Introduction
 Substantial recent progress in understanding 
emotions has done little to resolve fundamental 
issues (Ekman & Davidson, 1994a; Fox, 2018; 
Griffiths, 1997). Despite general agreement that 
some emotions are universal (Ekman, 2016), 
debates continue about whether emotions are 
better viewed as discrete states or positions on 
dimensions. Their adaptive significance remains 
unclear (Lench, 2018; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; 
Roseman & Steele, 2018). The significance of 
cross-cultural variations remains uncertain 
(Barrett, 2013; Lindquist et al., 2013). Even the 
question of what emotions are is still unsettled 
(Adolphs & Andler, 2018; Griffiths, 1997; 
Scherer, 2005). These could simply be good 
questions that need more work. However, the 
lack of consensus after decades of work by 
hundreds of capable scientists suggests the
 Machines serve specific purposes envisioned 
by a designer, while bodies are shaped by 
natural selection to maximize gene transmission. 
A machine has one normal structure defined by 
blueprints, but there is no single normal DNA 
code or normal phenotype for a species. 
Machines are manufactured by a process that 
aims to make identical copies, but the 
development of organisms is inherently 
stochastic, so even genetically identical 
individuals will vary. Machines have distinct 
parts that serve specific functions, but most parts 
of a body serve multiple functions, and many 
functions, such as combating infection, are 
distributed among many parts. Failure of one part 
of a machine is likely to cause malfunction unless 
the design includes a backup system. Failure of a 
single gene or other aspect of a body may not 
result in general malfunction because the parts of 
organic systems are intermeshed in ways that 
makes them inherently robust. Finally, the 
complexity of machines can be described by 
defining their parts and their connections. The 
complexity of organisms is qualitatively 
different, with indistinct parts whose myriad 
causal connections frustrate attempts to frame 
simple elegant descriptions. Table 1 summarizes 




     
       
  
  
    
      
    
   







       
     
        
        
      
     
       
      
    
   
  
   




   
   
    
 
   
  
      
     
    
  
     
  
     
    
Viewing bodies as machines fosters major
misconceptions across biology and medicine.
For instance, students learn the Krebs cycle and
the clotting cascade as diagrams of simple causal
connections between separate boxes, ignoring the
organic complexity of multiple molecules
interacting with multiple others. They learn the
hypothalamic pituitary adrenal in isolation
from its many connection to other endocrine and
neuronal systems. Neuroanatomy courses 
often attribute specific functions to specific
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Such simplifications are necessary. 
Describing all of the connections of a molecule or 
all the functions of a component frustrates the 
mission of science to simplify, and the need to 
teach content that can be remembered and tested. 
Ignoring the organic complexity of evolved 
systems nonetheless distorts understanding and 
fosters misconceptions.  
Tacit creationism in emotions research is 
especially problematic. It encourages 
misconceptions that have fueled decades of 
controversy about questions that do not have 
answers of the kind we have looked for. Six such 
misconceptions each deserve separate 
consideration (see Table 2).  
 
The Structure of the Emotions 
No starting point for scientific studies of 
emotions could be more natural than trying to 
describe and classify them. The resulting effort 
has generated vast data and hundreds of articles 
that represent real progress compared to the pure 
philosophizing of previous centuries (Davidson 
et al., 2009; Ekman, 2016). However, noting that 
consensus is lacking would be a vast 
understatement. Locating different emotions in a 
space defined by dimensions, usually starting 
with valence and intensity, is an enterprise that 
continues, with ever more elegant proposals 
(Fontaine et al., 2007). This approach has been 
overshadowed, however, by attempts to specify a 
few basic emotions and their relationships to 
derivative emotions (Ekman, 1992). What 
seemed to be agreement on six primary emotions 
(happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise and 
disgust) has been challenged by proposals that 
four suffice  (collapsing fear with surprise, and 
anger with disgust) (Jack et al., 2014), that eight 
are necessary in four pairs (Plutchik, 1970), or 
that two, or seven or 13 are needed. To make 
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structures.  For instance, the hippocampus
is often described as the seat of memory, but 
it also has other functions and the 
memory network involves many other loci.
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sense of this diversity, some articles emphasize 
growing agreement that several emotions are 
universal (Ekman, 2016). A more explicitly 
evolutionary view considers emotions as 
specialized states that evolved from related 
ancestral states so their boundaries and exact 
number cannot be readily specified (Nesse, 1990; 
Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009), and the basic 6 
emotions capture under 20% of the total variety 
of emotions (Keltner, 2019). Hope that specific 
neural correlates will define specific emotions or 
dimensions turns out to be unfounded (Dubois & 
Adolphs, 2015; Skerry & Saxe, 2015).  
Thinking about emotions as if they were 
products of design encourages searching for a 
specific number of emotions with distinct 
boundaries and specific functions, as if they were 
parts of a machine. However, because emotions 
are products of natural selection, we should 
instead expect many states with indistinct 
boundaries and multiple functions. The desire for 
a simple taxonomy of emotions is deep, but such 
proposals necessarily provide a false sharpening 
that distorts our view. The system is not only 
more complex than we would like it to be, it is 
organically complex in ways that make it difficult 
to describe. 
Closely related is the difficulty in answering 
the fundamental question: what are emotions?  
Though it is the topic of innumerable articles and 
many books (Ekman & Davidson, 1994a; Fox, 
2018; Griffiths, 1997; Izard, 2010), the question 
remains unanswered (Adolphs & Andler, 2018). 
Adding an evolutionary framework provides a 
way forward by shifting the question instead to 
ask how emotions came to exist (Nesse, 1990; 
Tooby, & Cosmides, 1990). In this perspective, 
emotions are special states shaped by natural 
selection that give selective advantages when 
expressed in situations where they have given 
fitness advantages over evolutionary time. This 
view avoids controversies about whether they are 
natural kinds (Barrett, 2006). Emotions are 
biological traits, but they are not essentialized, 
universal, distinct entities with specific 
boundaries and functions. Instead, as illustrated 
by Figure 1, they evolved from other emotion 
precursors and therefore have overlapping 
boundaries and functions (Nesse, 2004). While 
there is moderate consistency across members of 
a species, variations between individuals are 
expected as a result of differences in genes, 
experiences and culture.  
In summary, the quest for a simple taxonomy 
of emotions has been like the search for the Holy 
Grail.  The object of the search does not exist, at 
least not in the simple form we have hoped to 
find. Accepting the reality that emotions are 
organically complex states shaped by natural 
selection requires revisiting the data with 
different ideas about what we expect to find. 
Recent efforts to use new available brain, facial 
expression, video and appraisal data to create a 
consensus taxonomy of 20 to 25 emotions offer a 
route that may transcend past difficulties if they 
acknowledge the organic complexity of the 
emotions (Keltner, 2019).  
 
The Functions of Emotions 
Attention to function traces a great arc of 
progress in emotions research. Neglect of the 
functions of emotions early in the 20th century 
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was supplanted by a variety of related approaches 
to their adaptive significance (Ekman & 
Davidson, 1994b; Frijda, 1994; Izard, 1992; Izard 
& Ackerman, 2000; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; 
Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). Machine parts have 
specific functions, so it seems sensible to seek 
specific functions for specific emotions. 
However, because they are products of natural 
selection, each emotion has multiple functions, 
including adjusting physiology, signaling, 
cognition and behavior. This integrated 
perspective grew with the rise of evolutionary 
approaches to behavior in the late 20th century 
that shifted the focus to how emotions give a 
selective advantage (Al-Shawaf et al., 2016; 
(Campos et al., 2006); Evans, 2002; Gilbert, 
2015; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Nesse, 1990, 2009; 
Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009; Plutchik, 1970; Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1990, 2008; Tracey, 2014). This 
framework makes it possible to differentiate 
emotions in terms of their functions of adjusting 
multiple aspects of the individual in ways that 
increase the ability to cope with the threats and 
opportunities present in a situation.  
   
   
   
   
   
    
    
    
   
     
      
  
   
      
  
   
  
Figure 1. A Phylogeny of Emotions (Nesse, 2004).  
 This focus on situations has major implications 
for the structure of emotions. Similarities and 
differences between emotions arise from the 
similarities and differences of situations that 
have recurred over evolutionary time. This
provides a framework for explaining why 
different emotions have central tendencies but 
blurry overlapping boundaries. In this view, 
different emotions are nothing like different 
species of animals; they are more like different 
styles of music with suites of associated 
characteristics. Blues, jazz, and rock and roll 
evolved from each other and continue to 
influence each other. They have clear prototypes, 
but uncertain histories and blurry boundaries that 
spur arguments among musicologists akin to 
debates among emotions researchers.
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The functions of negative emotions have 
been neglected, and for understandable reasons 
(Harris, 2018; Ketelaar, 1995). Anxiety, sadness, 
anger and depression may seem useless or 
harmful, a conclusion that seems to be confirmed 
by evidence that proneness to negative emotions 
is associated with worse health and relationships. 
However, the disadvantages of being on the end 
of the spectrum with strong tendencies to 
experience negative emotions says nothing about 
the adaptive significance of the capacity for 
experiencing negative emotions in general. 
Individuals with a deficient experience of 
negative emotions may experience even greater 
disadvantages that are covert because they do not 
give rise to complaints and requests for treatment 
(Nesse, 2019a).   
  
   
  
    
   
     
     
   
       
  
 
Recognition of the utility of negative 
emotions is growing steadily across the range of 
emotions research, bringing new research 
opportunities (Nesse, 2019a). The value of 
anxiety is widely recognized, although data 
demonstrating its utility are limited (Stein & 
Nesse, 2015). Despite extensive behavioral 
ecological studies that demonstrate the value of 
adjusting patterns of effort depending on risks 
and the availability of rewards, the value of low 
mood remains contentious (Gilbert, 1992; Hagen, 
2011; Nettle, 2004; Wakefield et al., 2017).  
Studies of anger and other social emotions bring 
in game theory to help explain unpredictability 
(Haselton & Ketelaar, 2006; Ketelaar, 2004; 
Skyrms, 1996). Expanding the study of utility to 
all negative emotions will provide an important 
missing foundation for dealing with the painful 
clinical conditions they give rise to.  
 
The Consistency of Emotions and their 
Expression 
Viewing organisms as machines creates an 
expectation that emotions should be consistent 
across individuals, consistent across cultures, and 
that all aspects of an emotion should be expressed 
concordantly. An evolutionary view challenges 
all three expectations.  
Individuals differ genetically, so their 
emotion mechanisms will differ.  The high 
heritability and extraordinary variation of 
emotion expression intensity, from alexithymia to 
the extremes of borderline personality, provides 
an illustration (Eley & Plomin, 1997). 
Differences in life experience also influence an 
individual’s emotion regulation mechanisms. 
Evolved mechanisms may adjust responses to 
certain stimuli adaptively, for instance, lack of 
care early in life increases stress responses 
(Meaney, 2010). Traumatic experiences may 
damage normal mechanisms, but it remains 
uncertain if this damage results from an adaptive 
adjustment pushed beyond its bounds, or an 
entirely different mechanism (Cantor, 2009). 
Moreover, emotions are different in different 
cultures (Kitayama & Markus, 1994). Genetic 
differences are possible but physical and social 
environment variations are certain to result in 
emotion variations. Some will turn out to be 
products of random variation, a few may 
represent the output of evolved mechanisms that 
detect aspects of the environment and shift 
responses accordingly and adaptively, such as the 
stress response becoming more sensitive when 
the early environment is harsh (Meaney, 2010). 
Different environments also give rise to 
different situations with different adaptive 
challenges. For instance, tendencies to intense 
striving for status may yield increased resources 
in technological societies but arouse social 
attacks in hunter gatherer cultures (Boehm, 
1999). In response to differences in situations 
encountered, the various overlapping aspects of 
an emotion response will tend to be organized 
differently in different cultures (Barrett, 2014). 
Furthermore, and separate, are differences in 
tendencies to describe patterns of emotions with 
different boundaries and different words 
(Wierzbicka, 1999).  
Appraisal theory avoids many difficulties by 
focusing on situations and the several kinds of 
decisions that must be made well to maximize 
adaptation (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; 
 The illusion that negative emotions are
useless is created because they are usually
aroused by disadvantageous situations and
because they are often expressed excessively or
unnecessarily. This is a result of the ‘smoke
detector principle’ (Nesse, 2005). In the face of
uncertainty, the costs of expressing an
inexpensive response may be far less than the
costs of failing to respond if a threat is actually
present, so false alarms and excessive responses
are expected and normal.
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Roseman, 2013; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  It 
helps in the analysis of cultural variation in 
emotions (Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001; Scherer, 
1997) and allows consideration of how the 
meaning of a situation may vary depending on an 
individual’s goals. That the effect of life events 
depends substantially on the individual’s life 
goals has been convincingly demonstrated 
(Diener & Fujita, 1995), but such research has 
been hard to extend, perhaps because it is very 
difficult to identify idiographic goals and link 
them to nomothetic responses. An evolutionary 
approach that systematically analyzes a person’s 
resources, desires, strategies and expectations 
may help to provide a nomothetic framework that 
can incorporate idiographic data (Nesse, 2019b). 
Concordant expression is expected for the 
components of a special mode of operation of a 
machine. When the automatic transmission of a 
car is shifted from “sport” to “eco-mode” a 
variety of adjustments are made synchronously 
and consistently every time. The expectation that 
aspects of emotion should also be coordinated is 
reflected in the description of other patterns as 
“desynchronized” (van Duinen et al., 2010). Such 
desynchronized patterns of expression are well-
documented for physiological responses, but they 
are especially dramatic when conscious 
experience of an emotion is absent despite other 
indicators that an emotion is present (Clore & 
Ketelaar, 1997; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Winkielman & Berridge, 2004). While the very 
idea of an emotion presupposes moderate 
consistency of response, there are several reasons 
to expect that the physiological, behavioral and 
subjective aspects of an emotion will not 
necessarily be consistently coordinated.  
Some variations in coordination of emotion 
expression arise from genetic variations and other 
stochastic factors. More interesting is the 
possibility that some arise from mechanisms 
shaped to adjust patterns of expression depending 
on the details of the situation. This has been 
suggested in specific form for symptoms of 
depression that turn out to be very different 
depending on whether the precipitant is a social 
loss or a failure. Social losses arouse social pain, 
crying and desire for support, while failed efforts 
arouse guild, rumination, pessimism and fatigue 
(Keller & Nesse, 2005). More work is needed to 
assess the hypothesis that such variations are 
products of an adaptation. 
 
 
    
 
    
     
   
    
  
    
   
 
    
  
     
    
   
      
      
  
   
  
   
 
The three-fold higher mortality rates for 
young men compared to young women in modern 
societies is a dramatic example (Kruger & Nesse, 
2004). Selection for male competitive drive and 
ability at the expense of risk avoidance and 
capacities for tissue healing is typical in species 
where males compete for mates. In species where 
females choose mates, males are often burdened 
with extraordinarily costly traits, such as peacock 
tails (Cronin, 1991). Occasionally, costly useless 
traits show up in machines for similar reasons—
Cadillac models from 1959 to 1969 sported huge 
fins with no purpose other than appearance and 
status display. The inordinate status striving that 
characterizes many human lives is similar.  
Analysis of human emotions that benefit 
gene transmission at a cost to the individual offer 
major opportunities for research to better 
understand when emotions are best suppressed 
because they benefit our genes at a cost to us 
(Chisholm, 1999; Nesse, 2019a; Sterelny & 
Griffiths, 1999). The cognitive distortions 
aroused by romantic passion often result in rueful 
retrospective wisdom. Intense status striving 
often seems to benefit potential reproduction at a 
     
      
    
        
       
      
        
     
      
    
    
   
 
    
  
    




       
   
   
    
    
      
    
   
 The parallel expectation, that natural 
selection shapes organisms to maximize health, 
welfare and longevity, is widespread but 
incorrect. Most genetic variations that increase 
health and longevity will also increase Darwinian 
fitness; that is why bodies usually function 
remarkably well for an extended period. These 
benefits are, however, wonderful side-effects of 
selection for maximizing gene transmission 
(Nesse & Williams, 1994). Genetic tendencies 
that increase reproduction are selected for even if 
they compromise health.
    
    
 
    
   
     
     
   
  
    
   
    
     
   
 
   
  











    
     
   
   
  
 Machines are designed to serve functions that
benefit their designers and users. Cars are
designed for transportation, telescopes for 
viewing at a distance, and saws for cutting. 
Some machines, such as computers, have multiple
functions, but those functions are nonetheless in 
the service of the user. The generally-justified 
expectation is that machines are designed to 
maximize their util i ty and trouble-free
functioning.
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great cost to individual happiness. And the joy 
people experience on news of their children’s 
success, and the pain on hearing news of their 
troubles, benefits their shared genes.  
 
 
      
        
     
    
   
    
    
     
     
    
  
  
   
    
   
    
    
      
   
     
   
     
     
   
   
   
   
  
         




Thanks to Richard Nisbett and Phoebe 
Ellsworth for very helpful comments 
 
References 
Adolphs, R., & Andler, D. (2018). Author Reply: 
We Don’t Yet Know What Emotions Are 
(But Need to Develop the Methods to Find 
Out). Emotion Review, 10(3), 233–236. doi: 
10.1177/1754073918772092 
Al-Shawaf, L., Conroy-Beam, D., Asao, K., & 
Buss, D. M. (2016). Human Emotions: An 
Evolutionary Psychological Perspective. 
Emotion Review, 8(2), 173–186. doi: 
10.1177/1754073914565518 
Barrett, L. F. (2006). Are emotions natural kinds? 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1(1), 
28–58. 
Barrett, L. F. (2013). Psychological construction: 
The Darwinian approach to the science of 
emotion. Emotion Review, 5(4), 379–389. 
Barrett, L. F. (2014). The Conceptual Act 
Theory: A Précis. Emotion Review, 6(4), 
292–297. doi: 10.1177/1754073914534479 
Boehm, C. (1999). Hierarchy in the Forest: The 
Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior. Harvard 
University Press. 
Campos, J. J., Thein, S., & Owen, D. (2006). A 
Darwinian Legacy to Understanding Human 
Infancy: Emotional Expressions as Behavior 
Regulators. Annals of the New York Academy 
of Sciences, 1000(1), 110–134. doi: 
10.1196/annals.1280.040 
Cantor, C. (2009). Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder: Evolutionary Perspectives. 
Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Psychiatry, 43(11), 1038–1048.  doi: 
10.3109/00048670903270407 
Chisholm, J. S. (1999). Death, hope and sex: 
Steps to an evolutionary ecology of mind and 
morality. Cambridge University Press. 
Clore, G., & Ketelaar, T. (1997). Minding our 
emotions: On the role of automatic, 
unconscious affect. In The automaticity of 
everyday life: Advances in social cognition 
(Vol. 10, pp. 105–120). Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. 
Cronin, H. (1991). The Ant and the Peacock: 
Altruism and Sexual Selection from Darwin 
to Today. Cambridge University Press. 
Davidson, R. J., Scherer, K. R., & Goldsmith, H. 
H. (Eds.). (2009). Handbook of affective 
sciences. Oxford University Press. 
Diener, E., & Fujita, F. (1995). Resources, 
personal strivings, and subjective well-being: 
A nomothetic and idiographic approach. 
Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68(5), 926–935.  doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.68.5.926 
Dubois, J., & Adolphs, R. (2015). 
Neuropsychology: How Many Emotions Are 
There? Current Biology, 25(15), R669–
R672.  doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2015.06.037 
        
        
     
      
      
       
      
       
         
        
     
       
   
      
       
      
      
       
        
          
       
     
        
       
       
        
     
        
          
        
  
Conclusion
Thinking about bodies and minds as designed
machines is natural, but it reflects a tacit
creationism that fosters major misconceptions
that obstruct progress in emotions research.
These misconceptions are not universal among
emotions researchers, and they are fading as
evolutionary perspectives are coming to be
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